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Abstract 
 
This article explores the relationships between (so-called) ‘non-traditional’ 
development cooperation (NTDC) and political leadership. Using the case studies of 
Brazil and South Korea, we propose that certain emblematic elements of NTDC 
discourse and practice can act to influence the relationship with political leaders in 
particular ways. These are (a) elevated language of affect, (b) interleaving of 
personal biographies with the developmental trajectories of states, (c) the use of 
NTDC to legitimise domestic policies and promote domestic political leadership, (d) 
the prominence of presidential diplomacy, and (e) the challenges confronting 
rapidly expanding domestic development cooperation institutions and systems. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last 10-15 years, a growing number of states have launched or expanded roles 
in humanitarian assistance, technical cooperation and development finance, often in 
concert with broader diplomatic, trade and investment agendas.1 Together with other 
‘new’ development actors such as foundations and a much stronger role for the private 
sector, the outcome has been a far more heterogeneous and polycentric development 
landscape.2 So-called 'non-traditional' partners3 are asserting a stronger stance within 
global development institutions in terms of dialogue and collaboration, or indeed, by 
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choosing to hold them at arm's length.4 Southern partners in particular have very 
successfully projected apparent ideational alternatives to some aspects of mainstream 
development languages, practices and ideologies;5 albeit not in ways that are contesting 
the evolving injustices of neoliberal globalisation.6 These changes present stimulating 
theoretical challenges to analysts of international development. In this paper we 
contribute to this burgeoning literature through a novel exploration of the relationships 
between political leadership and emerging/expanding involvement with development 
cooperation. While much has been written on the institutional, bureaucratic and legal 
structures of different non-traditional partners, assessments of particular political 
leaders have generally been individualised within specific country case studies.7 In this 
paper we seek to complement these studies by identifying broader characteristics of 
discourse and practice that potentially interplay with the ways in which political leaders 
assert their roles and identities in the context of rapidly evolving/expanding 
development cooperation.  
 
The paper sets out five loosely shared characteristics of NTDC that can act to shape the 
context for political leaders in particular ways. These are (a) the elevated language of 
affect, (b) the interleaving of personal biographies with the developmental trajectories 
of states, (c) the use of NTDC to legitimise domestic policies and promote domestic 
political leadership, (d) the particular prominence of presidential diplomacy, and (e) the 
challenges confronting rapidly expanding domestic development cooperation 
institutions and systems. We do not wish to over-state the case: other domestic and 
international factors intervene, and specific circumstances and contexts are extremely 
important. Even so, we propose that this broader conceptual analysis of the relationship 
provides some novel insight into shifts in terrain of international development.  
 
To explore these ideas in more detail we present two short case studies - South Korea 
(hereafter Korea) and Brazil. While Brazil is generally situated as a major 'Southern' 
actor and thus (in the unsatisfactory designation) ‘non-traditional’, Korea has long 
disconcerted simple hierarchies and spatialised rendering of 'developing/Southern' and 
'developed/Northern' countries.8 Notwithstanding its post-2010 DAC membership, 
many analysts point to an identity, narrative and set of modalities that more closely 
resemble those of other Asian and indeed Southern partners. In our view, Korea’s DAC 
membership alone does not place it with the category of ‘Northern’ or (so-called) 
‘established’ donors, in terms of ongoing domestic debates with regard to competing aid 
policy priorities, future visions, and self-positioning as a major recipient turned donor.9 
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Korea’s emphasis on the ‘win-win’ partnership, its development policy experience and 
the commercial profile of its aid programme (e.g. relatively high tied-aid ratio and its 
prevalent use of loans as an aid instrument) are similar to the practices of Japan and 
China.10 So we use ‘non-traditional’ here to include the overlapping category of Asian 
donors and development partners. All such categories entail problematic slippages, but 
we hope to show below that the pairing of Brazil and Korea is analytically useful. The 
paper does not provide comprehensive accounts of Brazilian or Korean development 
cooperation, but in each case focuses on the relationship between two successive recent 
presidents and their international development approaches and strategies. In both cases 
there has been a transition of leadership within the same party - the conservative 
Saenuri Party in Korea, and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party) in Brazil. 
Interestingly, the substantial differences between Korea and Brazil actually work to 
highlight surprising similarities in the narratives and practices, and the foregrounding of 
the role/impact of specific political leaders.11  
 
The aim of the paper is not to argue that political leaders are always and everywhere the 
primary drivers or architects of NTDC policies and practices; or to the extent that there 
are shared NTDC characteristics, to propose that they determine leadership agendas 
and approaches. Clearly, in all cases there are multiple domestic and external actors, 
institutions and factors that debate and shape NTDC, from overarching policies through 
to specific programmes and interventions. By the same token, Brazilian and Korean 
narratives and practices are not monolithic - like all development actors, they embody 
and voice complexity and plurality. With these caveats in place, we propose that some of 
the underlying characteristics of NTDC set up particular 'frames' for political leaders.  
 
Framing political leadership in NTDC 
 
Within the field of Political Science and International Relations, there have been 
attempts to assess the influence of political leadership in foreign policy outcomes, 
including in situations of foreign policy change. Although this literature recognizes their 
importance in signaling the relevance of factors such as the personality of political 
leaders,12 we have different objectives in this paper and we do not share the 
methodological approaches and tools employed in these contributions. Our aim is to 
examine the ways in which widely shared tropes of non-traditional development 
cooperation relate to particular projections of and roles for political leadership.  Our 
argument is in line with recent contributions that highlight the influence of political 
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leadership (particularly of the head of the Executive power) in enacting innovation in 
foreign policy.13 
 
To date, although there has been considerable research into the domestic politics and 
institutions of NTDC, including the role of individual leaders, political leadership has not 
been subject to a broader conceptual framing. There is good reason for this: analysts 
must be attentive to the differences in the capacities of different partners, and to the 
very substantial variation in their histories, agendas, languages and interests. The gaps 
between high level statements and their translation down to more complex ground 
realities also need to be noted and addressed.14 Even so, some commentators suggest 
that it is possible to trace a core of ideas and approaches that are distinctively claimed, 
articulated and practiced by NTDC partners.15 These include a narrative frame 
historically anchored in a Third World-ist and Non-Aligned Movement insistence on 
sovereign autonomy, international political justice and solidarity; an assertion of 
development expertise based on direct experience; and a holistic conception of 
development financing and activity, in which aid policies and programmes are positively 
blurred and blended with trade, investment and diplomacy. At the same time, most 
NTDC partners are working to expand their economic and diplomatic interests in ways 
that, unlike earlier eras, do not offer an ideational contest to the dominant regime of 
neoliberal globalization (rather, they are imbricated in the current deepening of state-
capital hybridity).16 Within this context, the following framework sets up five ways in 
which these loosely shared discourses and practices of NTDC may shape the agency and 
conduct of individual political leadership. We set these out in the abstract first, and then 
explore them in terms of the two case studies in the following sections. 
 
First, in speeches and texts, NTDC is very often framed in language that elevates affect - 
that is, sensibilities and emotions. The discourse of NTDC partnership projects an 
empathetic connection between states that share colonial and post-colonial histories of 
subjugation, as well as in some cases, linguistic and cultural affinities.17 Political leaders 
therefore have at their disposal an attractive and resonant set of discursive resources in 
which they can represent themselves as champions of solidarity, justice, growth and 
mutual benefit. NTDC is framed by powerful moral claims, with variation inflected 
through specific country histories, cultures and circumstances and frequent recourse to 
expressions of feeling – pain, warmth, empathy and so on. As we will see, NTDC-related 
statecraft is often highly personalised through the language and performance of affect. 
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This has a bearing on the second element of the framework, which is that most of the 
present generation of presidents and prime ministers in the South have themselves 
lived through national transitions, from being only or primarily recipients, and in some 
cases experiencing considerable poverty, to becoming more visible and active 
development partners. While individual circumstances are diverse, we find that this 
personal experience anchored within a national trajectory can enable explicit parallels 
to be constructed between the personal biography and experiences of an individual 
leader and NTDC discourses and practices.  
 
Third, NTDC is often strongly based around assertions of 'successful' development 
experiences implemented domestically. The role of political leadership can become 
important where those leaders have been involved in the launch and roll-out of these 
policies, and are therefore politically invested spokespersons for the 'transfer' or 
'export' of these policies within and beyond the global South. The experience of 
providing NTDC can serve the purpose of legitimising certain policies and leaders at 
both the domestic and international levels. 
 
Fourth, the history and contemporary practices and performances of NTDC are strongly 
associated with presidential/prime ministerial diplomacy at high-level meetings. The 
origins of NTDC are primarily located in attempts to assert Third World sovereignty and 
autonomous decision making, advanced by Nehru, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Castro and many 
others. Through events like the Bandung Conference (1955), the Tricontinental 
Conference (1966), and the Non-Aligned Movement (launched in 1961), Third World 
and other leaders contested their uneven insertion into post-colonial geopolitics and 
world economy.18 Development cooperation - the expression of solidarity and exchange 
of technical assistance, goods and finances - played a part in this. The history of NTDC is 
of course also one of subaltern agents, from Vietnamese technical cooperation 
personnel19 to Chinese engineers and labourers on the Tanzam railway,20 something 
that remains the case today.21 Historically though, the energy behind NTDC has been 
primarily generated from above, with highly visible displays of state-state conviviality, 
personalised in high-level summitry. These include the BRICS Forum, the India-Africa 
Forum Summit, and the China-Africa Forum.22 These and other meetings have become 
key settings for apex leaders to convey their political messages and to build up alliances 
with like-minded political peers. They are high profile stages for leaders to assert new 
and growing solidarities, often pictured (literally) in terms of leaders shaking hands, 
giving speeches, and sharing platforms. This individualised presidential prominence 
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sometimes outpaces NTDC institutionalisation, which leads on to the next part of the 
framework. 
 
The final characteristic of NTDC with implications for the role of political leadership is 
that in most (so-called) 'non-traditional' partner countries, development cooperation 
institutions tend to be less consolidated or powerful than other parts of their foreign 
policy structures and capacities. Typically, analysts point to fragmented and sometimes 
competing internal structures, and generally low levels of personnel and human 
resources. This results in limited capacities to set policy, disburse funds, monitor 
programmes, or take part in regional and international development forums on even 
terms with the more ‘established’ donors. Given the rapid expansion of NTDC, its 
blurred and blended nature, and the changing contexts of the 21st century, this is hardly 
surprising, and many NTDC partners are currently rationalising and expanding their 
development cooperation infrastructures.23 To date though, most have relatively limited 
institutional strength, which potentially enable a stronger role for apex political leaders 
in setting the tone and agenda for NTDC.  
 
In the next section of the paper we turn to Korea and then Brazil to examine these ideas 
in relation to particular contexts and people. For obvious reasons, these are not simple 
equivalents – we find more evidence for some of our proposed relationships in one and 
not the other. We would expect this to be the case in extending these arguments to other 
non-traditional development partners.  
 
Korea 
 
Korea has grown from one of the world’s poorest aid recipient countries in the 1950s 
into one of the world's largest economies. In 2010 Korea became only the second non-
Western member of the OECD-DAC (the other being Japan), a striking demonstration of 
its transformation. Korea has since been active in projecting an international image as a 
respected diplomatic bridging agent, and provider of development knowledge based on 
its experience of rapid economic growth.24 Korea’s net ODA provision expanded more 
than eight-fold from the turn of the century to USD 1.9 billion (0.14 percent of GNI) in 
2015.25 Its emergence in global aid politics and development debates is also highlighted 
in its hosting of various high-level aid talks, notably the 2010 G20 Summit in Seoul and 
the 2011 Fourth OECD High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan.26 
Notwithstanding its DAC accession in 2010, active diplomatic presence and growing aid 
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profile, Korea still has many attributes and approaches that are associated with other 
South-South/Asian development partners. Derived from its identity as a former 
recipient, these support Korea's claims to empathy and expertise, and in assetising its 
‘emerging middle power’ status, bridging between rich and poor countries.27 In this 
section we examine the five characteristics of NTDC activities identified earlier in 
relation to the presidencies of Lee Myung-bak (2008-13) and Park Geun-hye (2013–
2017).28  
 
The first two premises – the elevated language of affect and the personalization of 
national development history – are pronounced aspects of Korean aid discourse. Korea's 
remarkable development trajectory provides a dramatic backdrop for the invocation of 
leaders' personal stories. Both presidents have lived through the country’s rapid, recent 
development history, and their personal and professional biographies interweave with 
this national transformation. The experience of poverty and hunger in the aftermath of 
the Korean War (1950-53) remains in public memory, as well as the pains and triumphs 
of rapid economic development during the authoritarian developmental decades of the 
1960s to the 1980s. For instance, in 2012 President Lee Myung-bak delivered a speech 
at the reception for the second board meeting of the Green Climate Fund to secure the 
Fund’s permanent headquarters in Songdo, Korea, blending first and third person 
narratives:  
 
When I was a primary school kid, there was an American missionary, who 
used to clean old clothes and bring them in a large box to distribute to us. I 
would also queue up to receive a pair of used trousers. The small boy that 
queued up for the used trousers became a president. And he wants to offer 
aid to the countries where poor boys and girls like him are many, and declare 
his country has transformed from an aid recipient into a donor. This is not 
only a meaningful reward for me personally but I think it is the pride of all 
our [Korean] people, who had to undergo such difficult times in the past … As 
we know better than any others how aid-receiving people feel, we want to 
help them out in earnest. (President Lee, 17 October 2012)29 
 
By personalising the nation’s development trajectory in resemblance of his own history, 
the president projected himself as an epitome of the nation’s modern suffering and 
achievement. He could justifiably assert an empathetic connection to the poverty of 
others, but also invoke hope and aspiration through his own story of success. Needless 
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to say, what parts of the past are 'remembered' and how these are narrativised are 
malleable. In fact Korea’s ambiguous Northern/Southern identity is based on the 
transformation story, which contrasts its ‘Southern’ past with its present status of 
becoming an ‘official’ donor/DAC member.  While traditional Northern donors seldom 
emphasise their commonality with recipients, Korea’s aid rhetoric heavily draws upon 
its own recipient experience. It blends with national pride, which is expressed, for 
instance, in the self-image as an effective and compassionate donor which does the job 
differently from – and arguably better than - traditional Northern donors.   
 
Supporting the third premise, these personalized and affective development narratives 
can also be invoked to help legitimise leaders’ domestic policy choices and political 
influence. Korea’s foreign aid programmes have been explicitly subject to the particular 
policy preferences of presidents, reflecting the personal and political imperatives of the 
top leadership. For example, President Lee Myung-bak placed significant emphasis on 
infrastructure development and the ‘Green Growth’ development initiative, while the 
Park Geun-hye government projected very strongly the Global Saemaul movement.30 
The external promotion of these initiatives can be seen in part as being designed to 
enhance the political standing of their particular advocates at home as well. For instance, 
President Lee was a former CEO of Hyundai Construction and Engineering, and a strong 
believer in economic growth spurred by investment in economic infrastructure.31 It was 
widely known that President Lee was personally interested and deeply engaged in the 
discursive push to mainstream economic growth and knowledge sharing initiatives at 
the G20 Seoul Development Consensus in 2010.32 This in turn fed into the global 
momentum behind the policy shift from ‘aid effectiveness’ to ‘development 
effectiveness’, which emphasizes the role of development finance and the private sector 
in boosting productive bases of economic growth .33 Connecting to the policy emphasis 
on infrastructure development, President Lee also pushed the idea of Green Growth, 
making ‘Green ODA’ a key part of the government promotion of Global Korea. President 
Lee Myung-bak put his personal legacy and the country’s reputation on the line with its 
global leadership’ under his administration’s overarching ‘Global Korea’ agenda,34 and 
ODA was one means to realize that aspiration.35 The Global Green Growth Institute was 
established, and the Green Growth Fund headquartered in Korea with an ambition to 
make Korea the hub of Green Growth knowledge sharing and policy experimentation.36 
The East Asia Climate Partnership (EACP) was also established to facilitate the spread of 
renewable energy technologies and power plants as part of Korean aid to Asian 
recipient countries, with an aim to increasing Green ODA to take up to 30 percent of 
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total Korean aid projects.37 It is important to note that the concept of 'Green Growth' and 
its related projects were domestically contested. For example, through the Four Major 
Rivers Project, rivers were ‘refurbished’ as the government set out the goals of 
increasing their water storage capacity, mitigating risks of floods and water shortage, 
and ensuring ‘eco-friendly’ water management. The plan was carried out by the Lee 
government in 2008 despite considerable domestic controversy: environmental CSOs 
and experts feared ecological damage, while political skeptics thought that construction 
companies involved were receiving policy favors for their ties with the president’s 
business career.38 The international spread and presence of Korea's 'Green Growth' 
agenda as part of ODA package arguably helped legitimate its domestic roll out.  
 
However, following the end of the Lee government, the 'Green Growth' agenda was 
sidelined under President Park Geun-hye. Instead, the former Park government sought 
to project ‘Global Saemaul Movement’ (or Global Saemaul Undong) as Korea's distinctive 
contribution to international development. Opposition politicians accused the 
government of using public (aid) money to the president’s own political benefit by 
commemorating and glorifying her father’s developmental achievements.39 The original 
Saemaul Movement was initiated in the 1970s as a rural development project inspired 
and closely supervised by then President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), a highly 
controversial leader who spearheaded the nation’s authoritarian developmental state, 
and President Park Geun-hye’s father. President Park Geun-hye has frequently evoked 
the nation’s ‘miraculous’ industrialization and the ‘success’ of Saemaul Movement in the 
1960s and 1970s, drawing on her father’s economic legacy in a way to boost her 
domestic popularity. KOICA-led efforts to globalise the Saemaul Movement in its ODA 
programmes include inviting recipient government officials and civilians to Korea to 
immerse them in the hopeful ‘can-do' spirit of Saemaul Movement.40 Political 
sensitivities persist over the present government's promotion of Saemaul Movement as 
a major policy driver for Korean ODA,41 with critics remaining sceptical about its earlier 
motivations as well as its current revival.42  
 
The fourth and fifth observations (presidential diplomacy and institutional limitations) 
also apply to the Korean case. Notwithstanding Korea's growing wealth and OECD-DAC 
member status, a number of commentators suggest that its aid and development 
infrastructure does not fully reflect its international commitments and ambitions.43 In 
part, this is seen as a result of inter-ministerial competition between the government’s 
two main channels of ODA loans (by the Finance Ministry) and grants (by the Foreign 
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Ministry) in spite of institutional mechanisms to harmonize the two flows.44 Similar to 
other NTDC providers (and indeed some DAC donors), Korea’s international 
development institutions can be regarded as fragmented compared to other parts of its 
foreign policy apparatus and capacities.45 Analysts have suggested that this is one 
reason why elite political influence is particularly prominent in shaping Korea’s key 
policy decisions in its ODA programme, reflecting the motivations and ideological 
orientations of the top political leadership under the highly centralized presidential 
system in Korea. The country’s five-year presidential system, limited to a single-term in 
office, means that certain ODA policy catchphrases are often short-lived, lacking longer-
term consistency and vulnerable to power transition in political leadership. For instance, 
President Lee’s pledge – proclaimed in Busan HLF-4 – to increase the country’s ODA 
volume to 0.25 percent of GNI by 2015 has not been fulfilled under the Park government, 
and there is no internal accountability mechanism across the presidencies. Excessive 
reliance on the preferences and will of top political leaders may undermine the stability 
and predictability in Korean ODA policy.   
 
Analyses of Korea's growing profile as an international development partner 
demonstrate the ways in which individual presidents have - to some extent - shaped 
particular narratives, initiatives and programmes.  Successive presidents have asserted 
their influence over the content of ODA programmes to further domestic political 
support, as well as to raise Korea’s standing internationally. The wider characteristics of 
NTDC enable and even encourage the projection of individual leaders in ways that blend 
the personal and professional. Korea demonstrates, for example, the affective 
opportunity offered to leaders of ‘non-traditional’ partner states. President Lee, in 
particular, was able to deploy his personal biography to powerful effect in global 
meetings – a claim to empathy which has less traction in other areas of Korean foreign 
policy, and which is denied to Western leaders in their donor narratives. To explore 
these arguments further, we turn now to the very different example of Brazil. 
 
Brazil 
 
The analysis of the Brazilian case focuses on the period between 2003 and 2016, which 
covers the transition from President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) to President 
Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) both from the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party-
PT). We have not included the controversial transition to President Temer (see 
Marcondes and Mawdsley 2017). 
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Under Lula, Brazilian relations with the global South included a strong emphasis on the 
language of affect. For example, as his predecessors had done before, Lula acknowledged 
the important role that Africans, who were forcibly sent to Brazil as slaves, contributed 
to the formation of the Brazilian nation. Lula recognised a Brazilian moral debt to Africa 
because of slavery and often mentioned that the provision of NTDC under his presidency 
was a way of repaying this debt.46 At the same time, Lula mobilised affect as a strategy to 
promote a future of shared prosperity between Brazil and Africa. Speaking as the guest 
of honor at the African Union Summit in Sirte, Libya, in 2009, Lula stated: “Brazil did not 
come to Africa to apologize for the colonial past, we want to be true partners in 
development and cooperation (…) together we can make great things in order to 
develop our economies”.47 Within the Brazilian foreign policy rhetoric, the concept of 
‘non-indifference’ was used to justify an increase in Brazilian involvement with 
humanitarian and development cooperation, including in countries such as Haiti, which 
had not been on the foreign policy radar in previous administrations.48 Lula’s 
mobilization of affective language was often highly personalized - for example, Lula 
called Libya’s Muammar Khadafy a “brother” and a “friend” when he visited, as part of 
an agenda to expand technical and economic cooperation.49  
 
Personal trajectories are clearly invoked in the case of Brazil. When Lula became 
president in 2003 his interest in foreign affairs was generally unanticipated. Lula was 
not fluent in foreign languages and his career had developed entirely in Brazil. Although 
the PT had contacts with other left-wing movements, international issues hadn’t 
featured heavily in the party’s agenda. Lula’s rise to power nonetheless allowed for a 
connection between his own personal trajectory of overcoming social exclusion and 
rising to be the 'face' of the Brazilian left, and Brazil’s own trajectory of becoming an 
emerging economy as part of an economic growth trajectory combined with social 
inclusion. The social policies expanded by Lula (such as Bolsa Família) started to attract 
significant international attention as approaches to poverty reduction. Lula was able to 
personally capitalise on these successes, in part through references to the hardship that 
he and his family faced during his childhood, first in the Brazilian Northeast and then in 
the state of São Paulo.  
 
In late 2010, Brazilians elected Dilma Rousseff, a former political prisoner during the 
country's military dictatorship and a political ally of President Lula, as Brazil's first 
female president. During the campaign, Rousseff, an economist who served as Ministry 
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of Energy (2003-2005) and Chief of Staff to the President (2005-2010) under Lula, was 
branded as an efficient technocrat and the mastermind behind Brazil’s Growth 
Acceleration Programme (PAC). But while Lula was seen as a charismatic and 
conciliatory figure, Rousseff was portrayed in the domestic and international media less 
favourably: “Nicknamed ‘Iron Lady’, Ms Rousseff’s brusque manner and short temper ... 
have earned her a formidable reputation”.50 What is relevant for this analysis is that – 
rightly or wrongly – a hostile media and some analysts often explained the downturn in 
Brazilian development cooperation as the effect of Rouseff’s personal lack of interest in 
overseas issues. While this may have played some role, we should also note the growing 
problems with the domestic economy, and internal political struggles. One influence of 
Rousseff’s personal trajectory on foreign policy was a stronger emphasis on human 
rights considerations, particularly during her first mandate (2011-2014), although the 
record has been ambiguous, with domestic criticism of closer relations with Cuba, 
Equatorial Guinea and Venezuela. The reality is a more complex one than suggested 
here, but we observe the extent to which both critics and supporters tell the story with a 
high degree of focus on the personal characteristics, trajectories and priorities of Lula 
and Rousseff.  
 
The third element of the framework concerns presidential investment in particular 
domestic policies, which when taken up internationally may help secure greater 
legitimation and prestige. This is very evidently the case in Brazil, which actively 
foregrounds the extension of domestic successes overseas. This has been pursued 
through bilateral programmes, trilateral programmes (most notably ProSAVANA in 
Mozambique), and multilaterally. For example, in December 2005, President Lula met 
with the President of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, who stated: “There is growing 
evidence that Brazil is reducing poverty and inequality, through a combination of sound 
economic policies and pro-poor programs, such as Bolsa Família. The Bank is proud to 
have played a role in supporting such programs”.51 A series of initiatives were 
developed overseas with a strong connection with national programmes. For example, 
the emphasis on addressing hunger led to the creation of the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) 
programme in 2003 strongly promoted during presidential visits in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. Within the Foreign Ministry, a General Coordination for Actions Against 
Hunger (CGFOME) was created in 2004 to channel Brazil’s donations for humanitarian 
assistance, mostly food, to countries in need. The More Food Programme created within 
the Ministry of Agrarian Development and designed to support family agriculture in 
Brazil was ‘expanded’ to Africa and Latin America via the More Food International 
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Programme. Domestic initiatives in the health sector, such as the ‘milk-banks’ project 
have also been ‘replicated’ in African and Latin American countries with the assistance 
of the Brazilian institutions that developed the programmes at home.52 
 
Lula and to a lesser extend Rousseff were able to benefit politically from the sharing of 
these successful domestic experiences. For example, in 2011, José Graziano, who served 
as Extraordinary Minister for Food Security under Lula (2003-2004) and who is a key 
figure associated with the creation of Fome Zero, was elected Director General of the 
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Graziano’s candidacy was supported by 
African countries with the promise that programmes similar to Fome Zero could be 
implemented by FAO. The connection between domestic initiatives associated with 
social policy and Brazilian NTDC continued under Rousseff. A Centre of Excellence 
Against Hunger (Centro de Excelência Contra Fome) was created in 2011 as part of a 
joint-action between the Brazilian government and the World Food Programme.   
 
In terms of the fourth element of the framework, Brazil has had a tradition of 
presidential diplomacy predating Lula/Rousseff.53 Active presidential diplomacy under 
Lula included a wide range of presidential visits overseas and the hosting of foreign 
leaders in Brazil. Lula was particularly keen to strengthen relations with the global 
South. During his period in office, Brazil became a member of BRICS and of IBSA, and 
Lula significantly expanded Brazil’s NTDC cooperation. However, Roussef’s capacity and 
desire to implement an active NTDC-oriented presidential diplomacy was undermined 
by domestic demands deriving from the economic crisis and internal dissatisfaction 
with the PT-led government, especially due to corruption charges, as well as a 
perception of the need to refocus Brazilian foreign policy towards more ‘traditional 
markets’. 
 
Finally, the Brazilian case is also illustrative of the weight that political leadership has on 
NTDC in comparison to a more modest role played by development cooperation 
institutions. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) is not an autonomous agency but a 
division within the structure of the Foreign Ministry. The reliance on political leadership 
instead of strong institutional backing is reflected in the fact that although Lula was a 
vocal supporter of increasing Brazil’s role in NTDC, this did not translate into an 
institutional strengthening of the ABC or in efforts to provide a refreshed and fit for 
purpose legal framework for Brazil’s involvement in NTDC. ABC’s mandate includes 
coordinating Brazilian development cooperation, but it struggles to do so given over 100 
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federal institutions involved in the provision of cooperation.54 The emphasis on political 
leadership rather than institutional backing is also illustrated by the fact that the 
decision to initiate NTDC projects was often the direct result of presidential visits by 
either Lula himself or the Foreign Minister. Promises were made by Lula in areas as 
diverse as biofuels, health and education, which Brazilian institutions would then try to 
accommodate. President Lula was a strong supporter of the role of the Foreign Ministry 
and provided his foreign minister with considerable autonomy, which facilitated an 
increase in the number of incoming diplomats and in the opening of new diplomatic 
posts, especially in the global South. The situation was different under Rousseff. One 
interviewee suggested that Rousseff’s own trajectory within different ministries means 
that she was socialized within government sectors that tend to have a negative view of 
the Foreign Ministry, often identified as inefficient and elitist.55 Rousseff’s lack of affinity 
with her first Foreign Minister (who resigned in 2013) is also said to have undermined 
the continuation of an active foreign policy, compared to Lula’s warm relationship with 
Minister Amorim. 
 
As suggested in our framework, NTDC strategies often foreground a particular reading 
of a domestic trajectory of overcoming obstacles to development, and achieving poverty 
reduction and/or economic growth. Thus, efforts to promote NTDC are closely 
connected to the identity a state aims to project to outside audiences, including, but not 
limited to, the countries that are the recipients/targets of NTDC. In the specific case of 
Brazil, President Lula embodied Brazil’s (partially) successful domestic experience of 
economic growth and social inclusion. This transfiguration of the country’s experience 
in the figure of the president proved to be highly successful, especially with audiences in 
other countries of the global South as well as in certain international organizations that 
promoted the adaptability of these policies. Nonetheless, this strategy also has its 
limitations. Since the promotion of Brazilian NTDC was so closely associated with Lula’s 
own charisma and performance, once he was formally out of the office, the hype around 
NTDC was always likely to lose importance. In combination with a change in political 
leadership, the more difficult domestic and international circumstances that have 
contextualised Dilma Rousseff's presidency are the primary drivers of the downturn in 
Brazilian NTDC, but it is telling that Rousseff's own biography, personal attributes (such 
as gender) and political dispositions are often invoked to explain this policy shift. 
 
Conclusions 
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In this article we have examined how certain loosely shared attributes of NTDC 
discourse and practice relate to the roles, agency and identities of political leaders. We 
suggest there are certain characteristic features of NTDC that open up a space for the 
prominence, performance and role of apex political leaders. The five elements of the 
framework set out here are the elevation of affect, enabling a resonant and attractive 
script for leaders in their speeches and presentations of NTDC; the fact that political 
leaders are themselves personally and politically embedded in shared biographies of 
development with that of their states; the investment that particular leaders have in 
legitimizing particular domestic-international development pathways and programmes; 
the particularly strong role of presidential/prime ministerial diplomacy; and the relative 
weakness of domestic development cooperation institutions compared to other foreign 
policy sectors in terms of executive power. As the Brazil example shows, this can 
provide some explanatory power for periods of contraction as well as expansion of 
NTDC. We do not wish to overstate this argument - specific histories, contingent 
circumstances, other actors, political economy and geoeconomic structures are all 
powerful drivers of NTDC narratives, policies and practices in different places. Even so, 
preliminary discussions with colleagues and our own observations suggest that the 
ideas presented here should provide stimulating ways of thinking about political 
leadership and non-traditional development providers elsewhere. 56 
 
In writing this, we are also aware that NTDC is highly dynamic and rapidly evolving. 
Development cooperation infrastructures are growing and deepening in their expertise, 
experience and capacities. Ordinary people, labourers and companies are becoming 
more visible drivers and agents of South-South cooperation. The rapidly increasing role 
for national and regional development banks, and arguably a growing shift in South-
South relations, may see the language of affect (around solidarity, shared injustice and 
so on) replaced by a more pragmatic emphasis on delivering economic growth and 
mutual benefit.57 As NTDC grows and consolidates, the role for political leaders we have 
described here may change in ways that continue to provide insight into this complex 
phenomenon. Finally, although we have not pursued a comparative approach in the 
paper, there are also clearly points of similarity and difference with the (so-called) 
‘established’ donors – longer-standing DAC members. Some characteristics are 
differently performed and historically located (e.g. charity and humanitarianism rather 
than solidarity, empathy and justice), while others are not available to contemporary 
DAC leaders (e.g. the personal identification with a country’s development trajectory). 
By going beyond individual case studies, the aim here has been to explore NTDC in ways 
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that provide more analytical purchase on such points of similarity and difference, and 
some of the patterns observable in what are a diverse and dynamic set of actors. 
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